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Maritime Security Issues  
in an Arc of Instability and Opportunity 
Sam Bateman and Quentin Hanich 
The Pacific Arc of islands and archipelagos to the north and east of Australia has been 
characterised both as an ‗arc of instability‘ and as an ‗arc of opportunity‘.  It is the region from or 
through which a threat to Australia could most easily be posed, as well as an area providing 
opportunities for Australia to work on common interests with the ultimate objective of a more 
secure and stable region.  Maritime issues are prominent among these common interests.  This 
article identifies these issues and their relevance to Australia‘s maritime strategy.  It suggests 
measures Australia might take to exploit the opportunities these interests provide.  
The Pacific Arc 
A special issue of Security Challenges in 2012 focused on Australia‘s 
interests in the so-called Pacific Arc—the arc of islands and archipelagos 
lying to the north and east of Australia.  The overall conclusion from this 
collection of articles was that, in order for the arc to become a source of 
security for Australia, rather than a threat, Australia should take a more 
cooperative and long-term developmental approach and start seeing the 
region not as an ―arc of instability‖, but instead as an ―arc of opportunity‖.
1
 
There were good articles in this special issue, but some ‗sea-blindness‘ was 
evident in the issue overall.  The collection did not fully capture the realities 
of Australia‘s geographical circumstances—the fact that Australia is an 
island, highly dependent on seaborne trade most of which passes through 
the Pacific Arc, and with a huge area of maritime jurisdiction and extensive 
maritime interests that we share with our neighbours.  These interests 
provide a host of opportunities for Australia‘s engagement in the arc that will 
enhance the security of both Australia and the countries within the arc. 
Paul Dibb in his contribution to the special issue stressed the importance of 
geography, acknowledging the maxim of the most powerful Secretary of the 
Department of Defence, Sir Arthur Tange, that: ―The map of one‘s own 
country is the most fundamental of all defence documentation‖.
2
  However, 
nowhere in the issue is the maritime nature of the ―arc of opportunity‖ or the 
extent of our common maritime interests with our neighbours properly 
acknowledged.  Joanne Wallis in her introduction referred briefly to the 
                                                 
1
 Joanne Wallis, ‗The Pacific: from ―Arc of Instability‖ to ―Arc of Responsibility‖ and then to ―Arc 
of Opportunity‖?‘, Security Challenges, vol. 8, no. 4 (Summer 2012), p. 12. 
2
 Paul Dibb, ‗The Importance of the Inner Arc to Australian Defence Policy and Planning‘, 
Security Challenges, vol. 8, no. 4 (Summer 2012), p.14  
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problems of over fishing and sea level rise,
3
 and Ron May had a brief 
reference to illegal fishing and the Pacific Patrol Boat Program (PPBP).
4
 
Defining the Arc 
The archipelagic arc to the north and east of Australia was initially referred to 
by Paul Dibb in 1999 as the ―arc of instability‖ meaning the region 
―stretch[ing] from the Indonesian archipelago, East Timor and Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) in the north, to the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, New 
Caledonia and New Zealand in the east‖, a definition Dibb utilised in his 
contribution to the special issue of Security Challenges.
5
  Most 
commentators in the special issue narrowed their view of the geographic 
scope of the arc.  Graeme Dobell focused on states to which he saw 
Australia as having a sense of special responsibility: Timor-Leste, PNG, 
Bougainville, Nauru, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.
6
  He specifically 
excluded Fiji, from which Australia has distanced itself since the 2006 coup. 
Other contributors focused on the geographic and cultural area of Melanesia, 
usually taken to include: West Papua, PNG, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, 
Fiji, New Caledonia and sometimes, Timor-Leste.  In accordance with the 
majority view, the Introduction to the special issue treated the ―arc‖ as the 
Melanesian region.
7
  However, to treat the Pacific Arc as comprising just the 
Melanesian region is essentially taking a narrow political and cultural view of 
Australia‘s surrounding region. 
This article prefers a broader geo-strategic view that includes Indonesia with 
its dominating strategic presence stretching across the top of Australia from 
Christmas Island and Java to the Torres Strait.  Australian territory lies within 
200 nautical miles of Indonesian territory, particularly between Christmas 
Island and Java, between Ashmore Island and Roti, and across the Torres 
Strait.  The maritime boundary between Australia and Indonesia is one of the 
longest maritime boundaries in the world, and Indonesia is our key strategic 
partner in the Pacific Arc.  The broader view provides a true appreciation of 
the strategic significance of the arc and its implications for Australia‘s 
maritime strategy. 
A recent report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) argued 
that Australia‘s first strategic priority for regional defence engagement should 
be with our nearest neighbours, specifically those in the archipelagic arc 
stretching from Indonesia through Timor-Leste and PNG to Solomon Islands 
                                                 
3
 Wallis, ‗The Pacific: from ―Arc of Instability‖‘, p. 11. 
4
 Ronald May, ‗Papua New Guinea: Issues of External and Internal Security‘, Security 
Challenges, vol. 8, no. 4 (Summer 2012), p. 50. 
5
 Wallis, ‗The Pacific: from ―Arc of Instability‖‘, p. 2. 
6
 Graeme Dobell, ‗From ―Arc of Instability‖ to ―Arc of Responsibility‖‘, Security Challenges, vol. 8, 
no. 4 (Summer 2012), p. 34. 
7
 Wallis, ‗The Pacific: from ―Arc of Instability‖‘, p. 4. 
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and Vanuatu and the French territory of New Caledonia.
8
  This priority 
accords with pronouncements in recent Defence White Papers.  The 2009 
Defence White Paper identified Australia‘s most important strategic interest 
as the security, stability and cohesion of the immediate neighbourhood 
comprising Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, New Zealand and 
the South Pacific island states.
9
  Similarly, the 2013 Defence White Paper 
identified the security, stability and cohesion of our immediate 
neighbourhood, which we share with PNG, Timor-Leste and South Pacific 
states, as our second key strategic interest after the fundamental priority of a 
secure Australia.
10
  The White Paper‘s third key strategic interest is the 




Australia’s Maritime Strategy 
There are two fundamental dimensions to Australia‘s strategic thinking about 
the Pacific Arc.  Both point to the basic importance of Australia adopting a 
maritime strategy for ensuring its own security and the stability of its 
surrounding regions. 
The first dimension is the one well recognised in Australia‘s defence 
planning that the Pacific Arc is the area from or through which a military 
threat to Australia could most easily be posed.
12
  The sea-air gap (or 
sometimes, the air-sea gap) has a long history in Australia‘s defence 
planning lexicon although it has not always been well accepted on a joint 
service basis.  The Air Force often talks of the air-sea gap to emphasise the 
fundamental importance of air power in controlling the gap while the Army 
has often viewed it as a strategic concept that relegates land forces to a 
mopping-up role for any enemy forces that might have been successful in 
crossing the gap. 
A surprisingly recent development in Australia‘s strategic thinking is that the 
geo-strategic reality of the sea-air gap requires Australia to adopt a 
fundamentally maritime strategy.
13
  Justin Jones has tracked the maturing in 
the evolution of maritime strategic thinking in Australia‘s defence policy over 
recent times, claiming that 2012-13 might come to be seen as a watershed 
                                                 
8
 Sam Bateman, Anthony Bergin and Hayley Channer, Terms of Engagement—Australia’s 
Regional Defence Diplomacy (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2013), p. 67. 
9
 Australian Government, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence 
White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009), paragraph 5.7, p. 42. 
10
 Australian Government, Defence White Paper 2013 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 
2013), paragraph 3.13. 
11
 Australian Government, Defence White Paper 2013, paragraph 3.15. 
12
 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities: Report for the Minister of Defence 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986). 
13
 Australian Government, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century, paragraph 8.7, p. 59. 
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period for maritime strategic thinking in Australian defence policy.
14
  His 
reasons for saying this include the frequent references to maritime strategy 
in the 2013 Defence White Paper, as well as the indications that the concept 
of maritime strategy has become joint rather than merely a naval concept.  
The Chief of Army‘s 2012 Land Warfare Conference was titled ‗Potent Land 
Forces in a Maritime Strategy.‘ Similarly, the Chief of Air Force‘s 2013 




There is a downside, however, to a focus on the sea-air gap—it supports the 
tendency for Australia to seek security against rather than with its 
neighbours.  Australians often regard the surrounding oceans and seas as a 
moat separating them from their neighbours.  This is in contrast with 
Indonesia in particular.  For Indonesians, the sea has a special, if 
ambiguous, place in perceptions of Indonesian identity.
16
  Concepts of 
wawasan nusantara and tanah air, linking the islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago together rather than separating them, are principles of nation-
building for Indonesia.  For Indonesians, the seas unite whereas for 
Australians the seas appear to divide.  Pacific islanders can have a similar 
view of the uniting role of the oceans. 
These insular attitudes reflect an image of Australia as an insecure nation 
that lacks appreciation of its own geo-strategic environment.  The late Frank 
Broeze, an eminent maritime historian, captured this outlook when he 
observed: 
Images and perception of national identity have revolved largely around 
inward-looking and often racist concepts of ‗continental‘ Australia in which 
the sea was seen as a fence shutting out unwanted intrusions from the 




The second dimension to thinking about the Pacific Arc is to regard it more 
positively as an area of shared interests, particularly ones of a maritime 
nature, that provide a host of opportunities for working together for the 
common good of regional security.  This positive view helps unite Australia 
                                                 
14
 Justin Jones, ‗A Maritime School of Strategic Thought for Australia‘, The Interpreter, Lowy 
Institute, 23 October 2013, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/10/23/A-maritime-school-
of-strategic-thought-for-Australia.aspx> [Accessed 27 October 2013]. 
15
 Chief of Air Force‘s 2013 Symposium, Royal Australian Air Force, 25 February 2013, 
<http://www.airforce.gov.au/News/Chief-of-Air-Force-Symposium/?RAAF-
V6XVbPdS8fWFYbePdytIuYgZUNpTNoA+> [Accessed 25 November 2013]. 
16
 Robert Cribb and Michele Ford, ‗Indonesia as an Archipelago: Managing Islands, Managing 
the Seas‘, in Robert Cribb and Michele Ford (eds), Indonesia Beyond the Water’s Edge: 
Managing an Archipelagic State (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 
2009), p. 11. 
17
 Frank Broeze, An Island Nation—A History of Australia and the Sea (St Leonards: Allen & 
Unwin, 1998), p. 1. 
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with its neighbours in building a stable region and assists in overcoming the 
inward-looking view mentioned by Frank Broeze. 
Security in the Pacific Arc makes a vital contribution to Australia‘s security 
and the protection of Australia‘s maritime approaches.  This dimension is 
captured well in the articles in the special issue of Security Challenges when 
it concludes that Australia should see the Pacific Arc as an ―arc of 
opportunity‖.  It suggests ―adopting a developmental, rather than security, 
framework‖,
18
 including consideration of the environmental concerns of the 
region.  The environmental concerns of the region are mostly maritime in 
nature, including over-fishing, marine pollution, destruction of marine 
habitats, sea level rise and maritime natural hazards (cyclones and 
tsunamis). 
It is both an opportunity and an obligation of Australia to assist countries in 
the Pacific Arc with dealing with these threats—as well as more generally 
assisting regional countries with managing their large maritime zones and 
exploiting their resources.  This was recognised in Australia’s Oceans Policy 
that stressed the positive role that maritime issues should play in Australia‘s 
regional relations noting that: 
Oceans affairs are rightly a central part of our broader political and strategic 
relations in the regions in which our neighbours have extensive maritime 
interests, including exclusive economic zones.  They also have an urgent 
need to build their capacity to manage these areas.
19
 
In his maiden speech in the Senate in March 2012, the previous Foreign 
Minister, Senator Bob Carr spoke of the importance of the oceans to 
Australia and its island neighbours.  He pointed out that Australia is an island 
state with the third-largest marine jurisdiction in the world, observing that:  
We have a great issue here.  With our partners, the small island states of 
the South Pacific, there is a lot involved in it.  I understand that those small 
island states are eager to have us make a commitment to the blue 
economy.
20
   
Unfortunately the expectations that Australia might elevate ocean and 
maritime issues in our regional relations were not realised in subsequent 
actions of government. 
                                                 
18
 Wallis, ‗The Pacific: from ―Arc of Instability‖‘, p. 12.  
19
 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Oceans Policy, Vol. 2 (Canberra: Environment 
Australia, 1998), p. 39. 
20
 Senator the Hon Bob Carr, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, First Speech, 21 March 
2012, <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2012/bc_sp_120321.html> [Accessed 27 
May 2012]. 
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Maritime Issues 
Most countries in the Pacific Arc have large exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs).  Table 1 shows how the island and archipelagic countries in the 
Pacific Arc have gained large areas of maritime jurisdiction, particularly with 
the regimes of the archipelagic State and the EEZ introduced by the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Australia is 
included in Table 1 to provide a comparison). 
Table 1:  Countries in and adjacent to the Pacific Arc—Land Area and Size of EEZ 
Country 
Land Area  
(sq km) 




Australia 7,690,000 10,710,000 1: 1.4 
Cook Islands 240 1,989,000 1 : 8,300 
FSM 701 2,900,000 1 : 4,150 
Fiji 18,272 1,338,000 1 : 73 
Indonesia 1,904,569 5,409,981 1 : 3 
Kiribati 684 3,540,000 1 : 5,175 
Marshall Islands 181 2,131,000 1 : 11,735 
Nauru 21 320,000 1 : 15,238 
Niue 258 390,000 1 : 1,512 
Palau 508 629,000 1 : 1,238 
Papua New Guinea 162,243 3,120,000 1 : 19 
Philippines 300,000 1,891,247 1 : 6 
Samoa 2,935 131,000 1 : 45 
Solomon Islands 28,530 1,340,000 1 : 47 
Timor-Leste 14,874 101,259 1 : 7 
Tonga 699 720,000 1 : 1,030 
Tuvalu 26 725,000 1 : 27,885 
Vanuatu 11,880 680,000 1 : 57 
Notes: 1. Size of EEZ includes territorial sea, archipelagic waters and continental shelves where 
appropriate.  2. Figure for Australia exclude the EEZ and its adjacent EEZ. 
Sources: Hanns J. Buchholz, Law of the Sea Zones in the Pacific Ocean (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1987) and CIA World Fact Book. 
The archipelagic State regime in UNCLOS allows countries that are 
constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and possibly including other 
islands, to draw straight baselines joining the outermost points of the 
outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that such 
baselines include the main islands and certain other criteria relating to the 
ratio of land to water and the length of these baselines are met.
21
 
Most of the countries in the Pacific Arc, specifically Indonesia, PNG, the 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, qualify as archipelagic States and partly as a 
                                                 
21
 These criteria are set out in UNCLOS Article 47. 
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consequence have gained large areas of maritime jurisdiction.  PNG is one 
of the largest archipelagic states in the Pacific region.  Its EEZ of 
3.1 million km
2
 is the second largest in the arc after that of Indonesia.  The 
Philippines is the other large archipelagic State in Southeast Asia and could 
well be regarded as part of the Pacific Arc in view of its maritime interests 
shared with other countries in the arc.  Of interest, New Caledonia, if 
independent, would also qualify as an archipelagic state but cannot at 
present because it is part of France and France is not constituted wholly by 
archipelagos and islands. 
Large EEZs and the maritime sector are a major source of income for 
countries in the Pacific Arc.  Ocean resources are the mainstay of most 
island economies.  While illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing is 
considered the major maritime security threat, other threats arise from 
transnational crime, illegal people movement, climate change and sea level 
rise, marine pollution, and the degradation of marine habitats.  A 
comprehensive view of security in the Pacific Arc requires consideration of 
all these threats.  Assisting countries in the arc with managing their large 
maritime zones and with meeting these threats presents a major opportunity 
for Australia the fulfilment of which would benefit both countries in the arc 
and Australia itself. 
STRATEGIC INTERESTS 
Maritime issues in the Pacific Arc have extensive strategic, economic and 
environmental dimensions that are common interests of both Australia and 
countries in the arc.  A key component of Australia‘s military strategy is 
shaping the regional strategic environment in order to minimise threats to 
Australian and regional interests.  As Joanne Wallis noted in the special 
issues of Security Challenges: 
Although Australian defence planners have focused on the Pacific Arc as 
the region from or through which a military threat to Australia could most 
easily be posed, a more stable region, with stronger states, could equally 
provide Australia with a security screen.
22
 
The security of shipping passing through the Pacific Arc is a particularly vital 
strategic interest for Australia.  About 62 per cent of Australia‘s merchandise 
trade (73 per cent of exports and 52 per cent of imports) by value passes to 
or through the Pacific Arc.
23
  This trade passes either from the north-west of 
Australia through the Indonesian archipelago or from the east coast to the 
east of PNG.  Australia thus has a major interest in the freedom of navigation 
through the Pacific Arc as guaranteed by the archipelagic sea lanes passage 
                                                 
22
 Wallis, ‗The Pacific: from ―Arc of Instability‖‘, p. 12. 
23
 Trade with the ASEAN countries, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and PNG.  
Figures are based on data in Australian Bureau of Statistics, International Trade in Goods and 
Services- August 2013, publication 5368.0, <http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/ 
meisubs.nsf/0/2E7E69A2898BC922CA257BF70011982A/$File/53680_aug%202013.pdf> 
[Accessed 25 November 2013], Table 14. 
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regime in UNCLOS.
24
  Australia played a prominent role at the International 
Maritime Organization in negotiations regarding Indonesia‘s implementation 
of this regime,
25
 but no other archipelagic country in the arc has so far 
sought to implement the regime. 
The Defence White Paper 2013 notes that ―the stability and security of 
Indonesia … is of singular importance and is our most important relationship 
in the region‖.
26
  Ministerial exchanges and defence cooperation and 
interoperability gathered pace over recent years
27
 before being suspended 
most recently as a consequence of tensions over Australian spying and 
border protection arrangements. 
Regular maritime exercises have taken place between the Australian and 
Indonesian navies, as well as coordinated patrols in the Timor Sea, but the 
vast majority of expenditure on Australia‘s defence cooperation with 
Indonesia has been on personnel training, counter-terrorism, disaster relief 
and peacekeeping cooperation.  These are important activities but there are 
also important opportunities to deepen Australia‘s assistance with maritime 
security in the Indonesian archipelago.  These include support for the 
development of BAKORKAMLA, Indonesia‘s coast guard agency; the 
establishment of Indonesia‘s National Maritime Information Centre; and for 
improving Indonesia‘s defence procurement processes as the Indonesian 
Navy expands and modernises.
28
  These opportunities have, however, been 
jeopardised by recent tensions between the two countries. 
FISHERIES 
Fisheries are a key maritime issue in the Pacific Arc.  The arc includes some 
of the world‘s richest and most productive tuna fishing grounds.  The 
Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries reported a record value of 
approximately US$7.2 billion for 2012, of which approximately US$5.3 billion 
was caught within the waters of Indonesia, the Philippines and the Pacific 
islands.
29
  These tuna fisheries are the only significant renewable resource 
for the majority of the Pacific island countries (PICs) and provide vitally 
important employment, livelihoods and food security.  In addition, revenue 
from tuna fishing licences can contribute up to half of gross domestic product 
and are significant components of national economies for Federated States 
                                                 
24
 UNCLOS Article 53. 
25
 Robin Warner, ‗Implementing the Archipelagic Regime in the International Maritime 
Organization‘, in Donald Rothwell and Sam Bateman (eds), Navigational Rights and Freedoms 
and the New Law of the Sea (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000), pp. 170-1. 
26
 Australian Government, Defence White Paper 2013, paragraph 3.17 
27
 Bateman, Bergin and Channer, Terms of Engagement, p. 25. 
28
 Benjamin Schreer, Moving Beyond Ambitions? Indonesia’s Military Modernisation (Canberra: 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 2013), especially pp. 18-22. 
29
 Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, ‗Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries‘ (Excel Database) 
Honiara, Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, 2013. 
Maritime Security Issues in an Arc of Instability and Opportunity 
 - 95 - 




Poor compliance with licence conditions by fishing vessels has been a major 
problem in the region for decades.  In 2009, the Pacific Islands Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FFA) commissioned a series of analytical studies which 
found that the majority of illegal fishing in the Pacific islands region was 
associated with licensed vessels, and identified misreporting of catch as a 
key compliance concern.  Misreporting is a form of criminal fraud where 
licensed vessels intentionally understate catches for financial gain (similar to 
tax evasion).  This effectively steals scarce revenue from developing coastal 
States and undermines the effectiveness of fisheries management.
31
 
Australia provides significant support for fisheries management, 
development and enforcement programmes, primarily through funding to the 
regional fisheries organisations: the FFA, and the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community‘s (SPC) Division of Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine 
Ecosystems (FAME). 
ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS 
Australia has a major interest in the preservation and protection of the 
marine environment of the ocean and the conservation of its living 
resources.  However, those objectives can be achieved only with 
cooperation between neighbouring littoral and island countries.  Australia is a 
key player or supporter of regional arrangements for protecting and 
preserving the marine environment.   
The prevention and mitigation of maritime natural hazards (tsunamis and 
cyclones), including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, is an 
important common interest of Australia and its neighbours.  The introduction 
into service of the two Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships being built for 
the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) will provide Australia with an excellent 
capability for providing this assistance. 
The protection and preservation of the marine and coastal environments is of 
vital importance to countries in the Pacific Arc.  Marine environmental threats 
include ship-sourced marine pollution and activities that might cause 
damage to coral reefs in the region.  Climate change and sea level rise are 
issues of great concern, particularly for the countries that include inhabited 
low-lying atolls.  As with fisheries, Australia largely works through or 
supports regional organisations on marine environmental issues.  The 
                                                 
30
 Quentin Hanich, Feleti Teo and Martin Tsamenyi, ‗A Collective Approach to Pacific Islands 
Fisheries Management: Moving Beyond Regional Agreements‘, Marine Policy, vol. 34, no. 1 
(2010), pp. 85-91. 
31
 Duncan Soutar, Quentin Hanich, Mark Korsten, Tim Jones and Jack McCaffrie, Safeguarding 
the Stocks: A report on analytical projects to support the development of a regional MCS 
strategy for Pacific oceanic fisheries (Honiara: Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, 2009). 
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Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) and the Coral Triangle 
Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security (CTI-CFF) are 
major organisations in the arc.  The Arafura and Timor Sea Experts Forum 
(ATSEF) brings together Australia, Indonesia and Timor-Leste to work on 
fisheries issues and ecosystem based management of these seas. 
The strategic priorities of the Secretariat of SPREP all have a significant 
maritime dimension—Climate Change, Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Management and Waste Management and Pollution Control. 
The CTI-CFF is a key arrangement for managing and conserving marine 
and fishery resources in the Pacific Arc.  A recent study estimated that reef 
fishes in the Coral Triangle are worth $3 billion, comprising 30 per cent of the 
total value of commercial fisheries in the region, based on datasets gathered 
from the Food and Agriculture Organization.
32
  CTI-CFF is a multilateral 
partnership of six countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Timor-
Leste, PNG, and the Solomon Islands) formed in to address the threats 
facing the coastal and marine resources of one of the most biologically 
diverse and ecologically rich regions on earth.  CTI-CFF is managed 
through a Secretariat based in Jakarta, Indonesia.  Australia gives high 
priority to supporting the CTI-CFF in recognition of its significant biodiversity 
values, the reliance of the region on coastal and marine ecosystems for 
livelihoods and food security, and the connectivity between Australian and 
neighboring marine ecosystems 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 
Transnational crime is a major issue for countries in the Pacific Arc.  Criminal 
activities with a maritime dimension include smuggling arms, drugs and 
people; illegal logging; IUU fishing; sea robbery; and illegal wildlife exports.  
These activities are facilitated by weak border security due to the wide 
maritime areas and lack of resources, the volume of maritime traffic in the 
region, corruption in both the public and private sectors, and poor 
coordination between agencies. 
Transnational crime in the arc has consequences for Australia because the 
arc provides an avenue for the illegal entry of people, drugs and other 
contraband into Australia, especially in the north-west and across Torres 
Strait.  This avenue may be a somewhat easier route for criminal activity 
than direct entry from South or East Asia.  The Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) plays a leading role in countering transnational crime in the arc with 
officers posted to all independent countries in the arc. 
                                                 
32
 Coral Triangle Knowledge Network, ‗Value of Coral Triangle Reefs‘ Fisheries Estimated at US 
$3 Billion‘, Coral Triangle Initiative, 11 October 2013, <http://www.coraltriangleinitiative.org/ 
news/value-coral-triangle-reefs%E2%80%99-fisheries-estimated-us-3-billion> [Accessed 1 
September 2013]. 
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Some of the many foreign fishing vessels active in the arc may be involved 
in smuggling or other illegal activity at sea.  A study by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime has found that fishing vessels are often involved 
in criminal activities, including the smuggling of migrants, illicit traffic in 




The maritime nature of the Pacific Arc and the extent of maritime interests in 
the arc suggest that there should be a clear maritime focus in our security 
engagement with these countries.  This should be part of a ―whole of 
government‖ maritime strategy, but there is little evidence of this at present.  
The low priority accorded the Pacific Maritime Security Project (PMSP) is the 
most striking example of Australia‘s failure to follow through on the strategic 
opportunities within the arc (see below). 
The lack of maritime focus is most apparent at a country level in PNG and 
Timor-Leste, where despite statements that maritime security is a priority for 
engagement, our actual defence engagement has been mainly focused on 
land forces.  The naval elements of the defence forces of these countries 
have suffered as a result, and both have major problems.  This may be 
attributed at least in part to the heavy preponderance of Army personnel 
serving in attaché and adviser positions in those countries along with the 
inability, or unwillingness, of the Navy to provide suitable personnel. 
PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY PROJECT34 
The inaction and delays with the PMSP provide a powerful indicator of the 
low priority accorded by Australia to maritime issues in the region despite 
their obvious importance.  This project is intended to provide a maritime 
security capability to replace the twenty-two Pacific Patrol Boats (PPBs) 
Australia gifted to twelve PICs in the 1980s and 1990s under the PPBP.  
Seven of these were to countries in the Pacific Arc—four to PNG, two to the 
Solomon Islands and one to Vanuatu.  Looking to the future, Timor-Leste‘s 
participation should be factored into the PMSP.  A significant side benefit of 
the PPBP that should be retained with the PMSP is the access and strategic 
presence provided by the positioning of Australian maritime surveillance and 
technical advisers in each of the PPB recipient countries. 
Australia‘s support for maritime security in the PICs following the PPBP has 
been a vexed issue.  The nature of the PMSP is still being studied despite 
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many years of consideration.  Defence is due to report a final assessment of 
options to government in 2013.  This leaves a short lead time for Australia to 
gain the recipient countries‘ acceptance of the preferred option, start the 
acquisition process, develop any new infrastructure required and commence 
the training of personnel before the earlier PPBs become unusable. 
The PMSP has been the subject of some ‗buck-passing‘ between agencies.  
Responsibility for the project was at one stage passed to the Australian 
Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) before being transferred 
back to Defence in February 2012.  Defence leadership for the project is 
important, as the Defence organisation has the overall strategic perspective.  
Maritime security will always be an important component of Australia‘s 
security cooperation in the Pacific Arc.  The Department of Defence has a 
central role in our multilateral and bilateral security engagements in the 
region both with countries in the arc and with France, the United States and 
New Zealand.  
The Defence White Paper 2013 makes a strong commitment to the PMSP 
noting that: 
The centrepiece of the Program will be the gifting of a fleet of vessels to 
replace the existing Pacific Patrol Boats, which need replacing over the 
period 2018–2028.  This fleet of vessels is planned to be provided across all 
states that currently have Pacific Patrol Boats (including Fiji upon a return to 
democracy).  The Program will also propose to enhance practical 
cooperation across the South Pacific including through strengthening 
governance structures that support maritime security and the provision of 




At the South Pacific Defence Ministers‘ Meeting in May 2013, Australia‘s 
then Defence Minister noted that options for the PMSP range from a 
straightforward patrol boat replacement program through to a coordinated 
surveillance and response arrangement, including the development of a 
regional multilateral development assistance agency modelled on the FFA.
36
  
Consultations are planned with regional states, key regional institutions and 
partner nations to inform and refine options for the PMSP.
37
  Unfortunately, 
this could be seen as an admission of a lack of progress with the PMSP, 
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since the project was originally announced at the 2009 Pacific Islands Forum 
Leaders Meeting. 
RELATED ISSUES 
The former Minister for Defence also noted other key activities that Australia 
would soon implement to help support regional maritime security.  These 
included a regional aerial surveillance trial and measures to strengthen the 
capacity of the FFA‘s Regional Fisheries Surveillance Centre with the 
provision of new equipment and software and support for the attachment of 
regional personnel (from police, defence or other relevant agencies). 
Although the PPBP provided Pacific island States with some national law 
enforcement infrastructure, the sheer size of the Pacific island EEZs required 
a cooperative approach.  In response, the Pacific Islands region adopted a 
treaty framework in 1993 that enabled member states to cooperate in 
surveillance and enforcement and share surveillance assets.  The Niue 
Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in 
the South Pacific Region is an umbrella arrangement that supports the 
development of subsidiary agreements to implement surveillance and 
enforcement cooperation at the bi-lateral or sub-regional level.  There are 
now a number of subsidiary agreements, and an increasing number of 
regular multilateral fisheries surveillance operations that include Niue Treaty 
members and non-members providing support (such as aerial surveillance).  
In 2010, Australia hosted a meeting of Pacific island justice and fisheries 
Ministers which agreed to begin the development of a new multi-lateral 
subsidiary agreement to the Niue Treaty.  This new agreement would 
support the implementation of the FFA Monitoring, Control and Surveillance 
(MCS) Strategy and allow for the sharing of fisheries information, cross 
vesting of fisheries enforcement powers, and the use of fisheries information 
for other law enforcement purposes.  In 2012, the Agreement on 
Strengthening Implementation of the Niue Treaty on Cooperation in 
Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the Pacific Region (the Niue 
Treaty Subsidiary Agreement)
38
 was concluded and is now open for 
signature by FFA members.  This comprehensive agreement will enter into 
force following ratification by four FFA members and will likely become a 
critical component of the PMSP, providing the cooperative and surveillance 
framework for maritime security operations in the Pacific islands region.  
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TIMOR-LESTE 
Maritime issues offer fertile ground for fostering good relations between 
Australia and Timor-Leste.
39
  Common interests in the maritime domain 
include security, resource development and marine environmental 
protection.  At present the Naval Component of the Failintil-Timor-Leste 
Defence Force (Falintil Forcas de Defesa de Timor‑Leste, or F‑FDTL) is in 
a poor state.  Its base at Port Hera has many problems including flooding 
damage and unsatisfactory berthing arrangements for its vessels.  Its five 
vessels are old and difficult to maintain.  The ability of the F-FDTL to patrol in 
the Timor Sea, where a high level of IUU fishing occurs, is severely 
hampered by its current vessels‘ lack of range and sea-keeping capability.  
Australia‘s maritime security assistance has been relatively limited—
Australia has offered more, including aerial surveillance, but many offers 
have been rejected on the ground of suspicion that Australia‘s assistance 
had ulterior motives. 
Australia did not appoint a naval adviser to Dili until early 2010, and then 
only at the rank of lieutenant commander.  The senior defence attache 
positions in Dili have been mainly filled by the Army and occasionally Air 
Force.  There is little direct contact between the F‑FDTL and Northern 
Command (NORCOM) in Darwin on maritime security issues, although 
liaison between NORCOM and Indonesian Defence headquarters in eastern 
Indonesia is becoming routine, particularly on coordinated naval operations.  
There are relatively few RAN ship visits to Timor‑Leste, while both the 
United States and France are reported to visit more frequently. 
At the regional level, regular maritime security meetings between Australia, 
Indonesia and Timor-Leste would be beneficial to enhance good order in the 
Timor Sea.  Australia might also offer to sponsor a maritime capability study 
to investigate the force development requirements of the F-FDTL Navy 
component. 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
By virtue of geography, PNG is an important factor in Australia‘s security.  
Maritime security is a key concern of both countries and should figure 
prominently in our defence engagement priorities, but in recent years this 
has not been the case.
40
  The Maritime Element of the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force (PNGDF) has four of the earlier PPBs, two LCHs (Landing 
Craft, Heavy), the Patrol Boat Base at Lombrum on Manus Island, the 
Landing Craft Base in Port Moresby, and some smaller units attached to the 
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Land Element.  It currently suffers from several major problems, including a 
lack of resources and skilled personnel, and low morale. 
The Lombrum base is very remote.  Re-supply and travel are difficult and the 
supervision of technical standards in particular is not easy.  It seems to have 
little priority for infrastructure maintenance and is rarely visited by advisers.  
This remoteness seems to be a contributing factor to the Maritime Element 
receiving relatively little attention in the PNGDF despite the priority attached 
to maritime security.  The Maritime Element has generally been neglected by 
senior levels of the PNGDF despite the presence of senior Maritime Element 
officers in HQPNGDF.  
Australia must take some responsibility for the problems in the PNGDF 
Maritime Element.  The redundancy programme funded by Australia in the 
early 2000s to reduce the size of the PNGDF led to the loss of many of the 
more skilled personnel from the Maritime Element.  Relatively few RAN 
personnel have been employed in PNG in recent years, and they have 
mostly been at lower ranks.  Australian advisers to the Maritime Element are 
not involved in the day-to-day operations and maintenance of the vessels as 
with PPBs in the other PICs.  Rather they serve in line positions in 
HQPNGDF and the National Surveillance Coordination Centre (NSCC). 
Because of reservations about the size and capabilities of the PPBs, PNG 
was initially reluctant to join the PPB project.  To some extent, those 
reservations continue—there is a widespread opinion that the country needs 
larger and more capable vessels.  With the improved national economic 
outlook, the PNG Government has plans to increase the size of the PNGDF 
and has already approved in principle the purchase of new patrol vessels, 
aircraft and firearms.  From an Australian perspective and for ease of 
training and support, it is important that PNG participates in the PMSP.  
However, the PNGDF now has a project looking at the acquisition of inshore 
patrol vessels, offshore patrol vessels and a multipurpose vessel for troop-
carrying and logistic support.  In view of delays with the PMSP, it would now 
appear likely that the PNGDF will go its own way with the acquisition of new 
vessels. 
As a key element of Australia‘s maritime strategy, the RAN should attach 
greater importance to supporting the PNGDF Maritime Element.  A master 
plan for the development of this element might be funded under the Defence 
Cooperation Program (DCP), including a ‗get well‘ program for its existing 
vessels, training, personnel issues and longer term basing and force 
structure requirements.  The planned increase of mentoring teams in PNG 
should include a naval mentoring team based in Port Moresby but able to 
visit the Lombrum base regularly. 
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Australia’s Administrative Arrangements 
There is a vexed issue with whether the administrative arrangements in 
Canberra are well tuned to exploiting the maritime opportunities in the Pacific 
Arc.  There is much more security activity at sea and there are more regional 
forums dealing with some aspect of maritime security.  There are more 
challenges and opportunities for Australia, but Australia is not necessarily 
well organised to meet them.  Australia‘s regional maritime security 
engagement requires tighter coordination, more systematic identification of 
priorities, and clearer policy direction. 
Regular reference is made to a ‗whole of government‘ approach to managing 
activities involving a range of government agencies, but often this can lead 
to a ‗hole in government‘ with ‗buck-passing‘ between agencies and 
important initiatives not being pursued because no one agency feels that it 
has the prime responsibility.  This situation is particularly apparent with 
maritime security engagement and with the provision of assistance to 
regional countries pursuing their maritime interests. 
MARITIME SECURITY ENGAGEMENT 
Maritime security has become more civilianised over the past decade or so.  
Many non-military agencies are now involved in providing some dimension of 
maritime security, including cooperation with neighbouring countries.  Civil 
law enforcement has become an important element of maritime security.  
This was the major consideration leading to the temporary transfer of 
responsibility for the PMSP from Defence to the ACBPS. 
Until the introduction of the military-led Operation Sovereign Borders to deal 
with people smuggling, Australia appeared to be moving towards a civil 
model for maritime enforcement.  In Australia, the civil agencies involved 
with maritime security, broadly defined, include the ACBPS, the AFP, Office 
of Transport Security, Australian Fisheries Management Authority and the 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority.  These agencies undertake their 
regional maritime security responsibilities primarily at a tactical and 
operational level while strategic and foreign policy oversight remains with the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of 
Defence. 
The Abbott Government has made several changes to the national 
arrangements for maritime security and border protection, notably the 
transfer of the ACBPS from the Attorney-General to the Immigration portfolio 
and the establishment of Operation Sovereign Borders.  This re-
organisation, placing the entire emphasis on people smuggling as the basis 
for border protection and regional engagement will not be helpful for broader 
maritime security engagement in the Pacific Arc.  Centralised coordination of 
regional engagement is required that covers all forms of transnational crime 
at sea, including illegal fishing and drug trafficking.  
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DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
The Australian Government released a comprehensive international aid 
policy framework in May 2012 to guide the growth of Australia‘s aid budget 
over the next four years.
41
  It identified five core strategic goals: saving lives, 
promoting opportunities for all, sustainable economic development, effective 
governance and humanitarian and disaster relief. 
Despite the major maritime aspects of these goals for countries in our region 
with large EEZs, the aid policy framework makes no specific reference to 
oceans or maritime issues.  AusAid‘s website lists twenty issue areas that it 
focuses its work on, but there is no specific reference to ocean 
development.
42
  Despite this lack of profile, Australia does work closely with 
regional countries to support the management, development and protection 
of their maritime interests.  AusAID, for example, has a range of program 
activities underway in the area of oceans management and governance.  
AusAID has a fisheries program in the Pacific, guided by its 2007 Pacific 
Fisheries Framework that outlines AusAID's key objectives in the sector.  
In 2012, the Australian Prime Minister announced $25 million to support the 
implementation of the Pacific Islands Oceanscape Framework, including 
significant funding to the regional agencies FFA and the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community to support fisheries management and surveillance 
cooperation.  The Oceanscape Framework was initiated at the Pacific 
Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in 2009 and envisions ―A secure future for 
Pacific Island Countries and Territories based on sustainable development, 
management and conservation of our Ocean‖ with a focus on integrated 
ocean management.
43
  Although in early days, it is envisaged that 
Oceanscape will strengthen coordination between the regional agencies and 
provide greater synergies in ocean management and conservation. 
In 2009 and 2010, AusAID supported the development of an FFA Regional 
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) Strategy.  The Strategy was 
informed by five analytical studies that: identified key risks; assessed the 
MCS capacity and implementation by FFA members; studied MCS data 
issues; examined MCS cooperation between FFA members (and non-
members); and examined the application of aircraft, ships and other assets 
for MCS.
44
  The analytical studies identified a need to improve coordination 
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and cooperation both within and between FFA Members, and more broadly 
with other maritime security partners; France and the United States.  The 
FFA member States subsequently developed the Pacific MCS Strategy and 
adopted the Strategy in May 2010.  The MCS Strategy aims to support 
fisheries management frameworks at the national, sub-regional and regional 




While the Abbott Government has closed AusAID, the Australian Aid 
Program continues to be implemented through DFAT.  No formal 
announcements have yet been made regarding the structure and 
composition of the Australian Aid Program, but expectations are that it will 
prioritise strategic interests and bilateral relationships.  While the aid budget 
has been reduced, it is still significant and would likely support development 
programs in the Pacific Arc given its strategic significance to Australia. 
Conclusion 
While Australia has been proactive in fisheries monitoring, control and 
surveillance, other aspects of Pacific maritime security have suffered from 
inaction and delays as is evident with the PMSP, and the lack of priority 
accorded to assisting the maritime security forces in PNG and Timor-Leste.  
Despite some significant successes in fisheries Australia has generally given 
insufficient attention to maritime security issues in the Pacific Arc.  Our first 
priority for security engagement should be with our nearest neighbours—
those in the archipelagic arc from Indonesia, Timor-Leste and PNG to 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.  As a subset of this priority, high priority 
should be given to implementing the PMSP as the cornerstone of our 
security engagement in the region, including with the inclusion of Timor-
Leste in the project. The opportunities for maritime security cooperation with 
Indonesia, Australia‘s major regional neighbour, should also be more fully 
exploited. 
As well as measures for the direct defence of Australia and its national 
interests, Australia‘s maritime strategy must comprehend the importance of 
defence engagement in the Pacific Arc on maritime security interests.  This 
means working with countries in the arc to manage and develop their 
maritime interests and to develop their maritime security capabilities.  
Unfortunately this requirement has not been well recognised in the past.  
The RAN itself has failed to attach the necessary importance to this type of 
naval diplomacy. 
To facilitate Australia‘s security engagement with the Pacific Arc, a trilateral 
forum might be established between Australia, Indonesia and Timor-Leste to 
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discuss security issues of common interest in the Timor Sea.  Similarly, an 
Australia-led Coral Sea Maritime Security forum could be established to 
bring together Australia, PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the French 
authorities in New Caledonia to discuss maritime security cooperation and 
information sharing in the Coral Sea region. 
The reasons for Australia‘s inaction with regard to developing key maritime 
strategic opportunities in the Pacific Arc range from some lack of 
appreciation of the geo-strategic significance of the arc through to 
bureaucratic ‗muddling through‘ in Canberra that has led to a ‗hole‘ in 
Australia‘s approach to maritime security.  These problems must be 
addressed if Australia is to have a true maritime strategy. 
An Office of Ocean Affairs in DFAT, similar to the US Government‘s Office of 
Ocean and Polar Affairs, located in the US State Department,
46
 might be 
established to provide a focus for interdepartmental coordination, and to 
advance the maritime aspects of Australia‘s foreign and security policy 
objectives, as well as the overseas assistance program.  This office would 
help elevate ocean and maritime issues in our regional relations, particularly 
with the Pacific Arc. 
Dr Sam Bateman is an adviser to the Maritime Security Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 
issambateman@ntu.edu.sg; and a Professorial Research Fellow at the Australian National 
Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong.  
sbateman@uow.edu.au. 
Dr Quentin Hanich is a Senior Research Fellow and leads the Fisheries Governance Research 
Program at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), 




                                                 
46
 US Department of State, Ocean and Polar Affairs, <http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/> 
[Accessed 20 November 2013]. 
